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PROTECTING WORKER SAFETY
AT THE EXPENSE OF
INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY:
An Examination of Implied Concertedness Theory
by Jay Kenigsberg
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)2 have
played varied roles in providing protection for the individual
nonunion employee who is faced with the dilemma of risk-
ing injury or losing his job when ordered to perform a cer-
tain task. During the 1970s and into the early part of the
1980s, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
broadened the application of the NLRA to cover individual
employee activity in the nonunion workplace based on an
implicit right within the Act.3 The OSH Act's provisions
4
as well as the Secretary of Labor's 1973 regulation,
5
reflected the growing rights of individual employees, and
were means by which workers could enforce their rights
and their employers' duties to maintain safe workplaces.
In 1980, however, the Reagan Administration began
implementing policy changes which would have disastrous
consequences on labor interests. The protection afforded
individual nonunion employees who protested working con-
ditions was rescinded by the mostly Reagan-appointed
Board, effectively ending a decade-old policy. In addition,
budget cutbacks and a de-emphasis of the importance of
worker safety left the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA) largely unable to meet its policy ob-
jectives. This article focuses on how the Reagan Ad-
ministration's policies have left individual nonunion
employees without reasonable means of objecting to un-
safe working conditions.
Analysis of the "catch-22" facing the individual
employee - work and risk serious injury or refuse to work
and face termination - begins with the NLRA's procedures
for protecting concerted activities. The major case law
which developed the implied or constructive concerted ac-
tivity theory is then examined. Emphasis is placed on the
Myers Industries, Inc.,6 decision, with particular attention
paid to the make-up of the Board when the decision was
rendered. Thereafter, the analysis switches to OSHA. It
reveals an administration confronted by a slumping
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economy and attempting to boost domestic productivity
by allowing employers to cut costs at the expense of
workers' lives. Finally, alternatives to the NLRA and OSHA
safeguards are examined as viable substitutes for what have
become meaningless statutory protections.
IMPLIED CONCERTEDNESS: THE NLRA,
THE BOARD, AND THE COURTS
The Meaning of "Concerted Activity"
When one employee acts alone instead of with others,
the Board and the courts have struggled over whether the
activity is "concerted." Federal statutory protection depends
on classifying the activity as such. In attempting to preserve
the institution of collective bargaining and achieve industrial
stability, Congress established rights under the NLRA. Sec-
tion 7 of the NLRA is the legal basis for protection of
employees. It guarantees to union and nonunion employees
the right to engage in "other concerted activities" for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection. Section 8(a)(1) helps ensure this right by making
it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with
rights guaranteed under section 7.
Some commentators have suggested that the term
"concerted activities" has no literal definition, but that pro-
tection is available to any "mutual aid or protection" activ-
ity which the Board or the courts deem concerted.7
Others have accused the Board of exceeding its discretion
when it interpreted the NLRA as protecting individual ac-
tivity on the basis of implied rights. This interpretation was
labeled an "unwarranted expansion" of section 7 protec-
tion.8 Proponents of this view utilize a literal definition of
section 7s wording, and insist that a lack of concert itself
suggests that the activity's purpose was not for mutual
aid.' Furthermore, use of the word "other" in the section,
it is argued, strongly implies that "other concerted activities"
were to possess the same "group" type characteristics as
the specified organizational and collective bargaining ac-
tivities mentioned earlier in the statute.10
Those favoring protection for individual activity prefer
a constructive definition arguing that implied rights must
be recognized if the purpose of the Act is to be carried out.
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And some have suggested that the word "concerted" be
removed from section 7 in view of the language of section
9(a) which provides, in part, "any individual employee shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their
[sic] employer"."
Regardless of which arguments are supported by the
Board or the courts, the employee activity in question must
have a lawful objective achievable through lawful means
and must be for mutual aid or protection in order to be
protected. The first requirement, then, for protection of in-
dividual nonunion employees based on concerted activity
is that the employee's activity is for mutual aid or protec-
tion and not just for personal benefit.
Defining Concerted Activity for
Mutual Aid or Protection
In NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 12 the
Supreme Court held that safety concerns were a condition
of employment, and could therefore be the basis of a pro-
tected refusal to work. The Board had held that a group
of nonunionized employees who refused to work in a shop
they felt was too cold, were protected by the Act.'3 The
Fourth Circuit, however, placed safety among the aspects
of employment subject to managerial discretion.14 By
siding with the Board, the Supreme Court extended the
"concerted activities" doctrine to activities not related to
a collective bargaining agreement.
The Supreme Court's Washington Aluminum decision
not only made safety concerns a legitimate condition of
employment, it also held that the reasonableness of the
employees' perceptions as to whether a labor dispute ex-
isted was irrelevant. Only the good faith of the employees'
perception could be questioned. Nevertheless, the question
still remained open: could individual activity be protected
under section 7?
When the Board decided Interboro Contractors's in
1966, it developed a constructive concerted activity theory
with the following underpinnings: (1) the assertion of a col-
lective bargaining right is an extension of the concerted ac-
tivity that gave rise to the agreement, and (2) this asser-
tion affects all employees covered by the agreement. Thus,
individual action seeking to implement terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement is merely an extension of the con-
certed activity which gave rise to the agreement in the first
place. In order for an individual's action to be deemed "con-
structive" concerted activity and receive the protection of
section 7, a collective bargaining agreement is essential.
This is the source of the employee's claimed rights, and
constitutes the employee's connection with the expressed
will of all other employees.' 6
The Interboro doctrine was upheld by the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc.." The
Court made clear that an individual employee could not
assert his rights without the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Collective bargaining would be useless if the in-
dividual did not have the right to enforce the agreement.
Unlike Washington Aluminum, the employees' conduct
must be based on a reasonable and honest belief. Impor-
tantly, the decision did recognize implied concertedness.
The concept of concertedness was broadened via the "im-
plied" benefit other employees derive from the activity of
the individual employee.'8 The next logical step for the
Board to take would be to create a parallel doctrine for the
nonunion workplace.
Since the NLRA does not separate the rights of union
and nonunion employees, cases involving protected con-
certed activities of union members can set precedents in
nonunion cases. The Board's holding in Alleluia Cushion
Company19 was an extension of the principle found in In-
terboro Contractors:
Where an employee speaks up and seeks to en-
force statutory provisions relating to occupa-
tional safety designed for the benefit of all
employees, in the absence of any evidence that
fellow employees discount such representation,
we will find an implied consent thereto and
deem such activity to be concerted."0
In Alleluia Cushion, an individual nonunionized
employee sought to secure his employer's compliance with
a statutory obligation imposed by applicable occupational
safety and health legislation. The Board viewed social and
protective labor legislation as arising from shared employee
concerns. Therefore, enactment of the legislation is for the
benefit and protection of all employees.21 Where an In-
dividual nonunionized employee seeks to enforce minimum
safety and health requirements, legislatively provided for
since they have been perceived as in the public interest,
he is engaged in constructive concerted activity. The im-
plied consent of other employees "emanates" from the
assertion of statutory rights.' The Board looked to
OSHA, and found that safety was a common concern of
all employees; therefore, the existence or nonexistence of
a collective bargaining agreement is immaterial.' As in
Washington Aluminum, the reasonableness of the worker's
perception of a safety hazard was irrelevant.
While the Board continued to apply to the doctrine
of Alleluia Cushion24 and even expanded section 7 protec-
tion to individual complaints made to the Federal Wage
Hour Division and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the circuit courts refused to follow the Board's
lead.' A common rationale found in many court deci-
sions denying enforcement of a Board decision was similar
to that of Bighorn Beverage6 in which the Court of Ap-
peals emphasized the collective bargaining agreement as
essential to the constructive concerted activity theory.
Construing the general principle of Alleluia Cushion
to deem concerted any individual activity which raises an
issue of "mutual concern" to other employees in the plant,
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the Board began applying the concertedness doctrine when
general terms of employment were at the most of an assum-
ed concern to other employees. Thus, wage demands under
uniform pay systems,' individual protests about working
conditions,28 and individual inquiries concerning the
employer's solvency' were all labeled concerted activity.
In these types of cases, many arguments can be raised on
the issue of where to draw the line between activity which
is only personal "griping" and that which is of mutual con-
cern. For this reason, we are concerned with the more
specific and innovative theme of Alleluia Cushion: a com-
plaint by an individual employee which finds its source in
public labor legislation or regulations is presumed to be of
mutual concern to all employees, and that presumption can
only be overcome by proof of general employee disavowal.
Extending section 7 protection to all work related claims
of individual, nonunionized employees may be too broad;
however, there is no justification for allowing employers
to maintain hazardous working conditions in violation of
statutory requirements which force employees to decide
between their jobs and their lives.
Myers Industries: A Step Backward
An employee of Myers Industries experienced an ac-
cident in the truck he was driving because it had defective
brakes. After the accident, he notified the Tennessee Public
Service Commission which, after an inspection, put the
truck out of service. The vice-president of Myers discharg-
ed the driver, telling him "we can't have you calling the cops
all the time." An administrative law judge ruled that the
discharge violated section 8(a)(1). In rejecting the ALJ's con-
clusion, the Board overruled the Alleluia doctrine and
returned to a literal interpretation of "concerted activity."'
The return to an objective standard of "concerted ac-
tivity" was prompted by the Board's belief that the Alleluia
standard did not coincide with the principles of section 7.
Many post-Alleluia decisions were viewed as interpretations
of public policy rather than the Act. Specifically, the Board
saw the extension of the doctrine to areas where employees
were assumed to have a common concern in the absence
of relevant legislation as totally unwarranted. Citing an
overall rejection by the courts of the Alleluia standard as
its authority, the Board announced the Myers standard:
the individual employee's activity must be engaged in with
or on the authority of other employees, and not solely on
behalf of the employee himself.3 In effect, two or more
employees must join in or authorize conduct before activi-
ty can be concerted under section 7.
The Board's decisions since Myers have strictly
adhered to a literal reading of section 7 which, in practical
terms, means that a complaint by an individual employee
requires specific authorization by other employees.
-32
Therefore, retaliatory discharge has been allowed by the
Board when an employee's activity had to do with worker
safety, worker's compensation, unemployment benefits,
and wage and hour standards.' The courts, however,
were not as receptive of the new standard. Noting that the
Board's function is to apply the provisions of the NLRA
to the complexities of industrial life, and that the Board
has the substantial responsibility of determining the scope
of section 7 protection in order to promote the purposes
of the NLRA, the D.C. Circuit, in Prill v. NLRB,' and the
2nd Circuit, in Ewing v. NLRB, s refused to apply Myers.
In Prill (on petition for review from Myers), the court
explained that City Disposal emphasized that neither the
history nor the language of section 7 required "concerted
activity" to be taken literally. Individual activity must at
times be given protection so that employee initiatives seek-
ing to better terms of employment and working conditions
won't be discouraged. The Court admonished the Myers
Board for failing to consider how the discharge of the
employee would have a "chilling effect" on other employees'
future activities to improve working conditions. The court
in Ewing was also concerned with the Board's failure to
address how an employee's lay-off for a safety complaint
may have a "chilling effect" on the collective rights of other
employees. As emphasized by the Prill decision, the
language of section 7:
is not precise as to the manner in which par-
ticular actions of an individual employee must
be linked to the actions of fellow employees in
order to permit it to be said that the individual
is engaged in concerted activity.36
Utilizing this concept, the 2nd Circuit held that:
It is reasonable to presume, as did the Board
in Alleluia, that co-employees support an in-
dividual employee's right to seek statutorily
guaranteed terms and conditions of
employment."
An employment-related statutory right is a collective right
held by all employees. According to the court in Ewing,
it is within the Board's discretion to find that an individual's
reasonable and good faith invocation of a statutory right
is so closely related to the interests of fellow employees
that the individual is engaged in concerted activity.
Both Prill and Ewing were remanded to the Board. In
Ewing, the court demanded a basis for the Board's defini-
tion of "concerted activities." The court in Prill found that
the Myers standard did not constitute a return to the stan-
dards traditionally applied by the Board, but was in fact
substantially more restrictive. Since Myers was decided
prior to City Disposal, the court ordered that the Board
reconsider the issue in light of the analysis of section 7 in
that later opinion. The court faulted the Board for providing
no rational basis for its determination in Myers. The best
place to look for any rational reason for the Myers deci-
sion is in the make-up of the Board at the time of the
decision.
I
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The NLRB Under Reagan:
An Explanation for Myers
A Reagan majority took control of the Board in late
1983 until shortly after the Myers decision. Ten major
Board decisions during that period were diametrically op-
posed to labor interests. This set the stage for a national
labor policy with a strong management bias.1 When
Myers was decided, the Board consisted of three members
appointed by Reagan, one appointed by Carter, with one
seat left vacant. Before Donald L. Dotson's appointment
as chairman in March 1983, 55% of the Board's decisions
upheld unfair labor practice charges against employers.
Following Dotson's appointment, the rate fell to just 25%.
This rate is in keeping with Dotson's dogmatic and
ideological approach to labor law policy. Mr. Dotson argued
that a shift in labor policy was necessary because of strong
and increasing international competition. In maintaining this
policy, not only would Board decisions reflect the shift, but,
he also planned to reclaim authority from the general
counsel to oversee enforcement of the Board's decisions
in courts. Some viewed Dotson's actions as a right-wing
plot set-up by the Republican board to subvert the general
counsel's operations, however, Dotson denied this.39
While labor's reaction was one of resentment towards
the new Board, management lawyers viewed the new ac-
tions as a return to rationality. Throughout the 1970's the
Board was perceived as labor-based. It was criticized for
straying far from the original purposes of the NLRA, and
as demonstrating a lack of appreciation for the realities of
the workplace. Others believed that the long-term effect
of changing policy with each new administration would
eventually lead to an ineffective agency. 4°
Don Z. Zimmerman was the remaining Carter ap-
pointee and the longest-serving member of the Board at
the time of the Myers decision. Not only did he dissent in
the Myers decision, but he did so in every major case of
1984." His dissent in Myers provided insight into how
different administrations take total control of the NLRB,
and also articulated the views later accepted in Prill and
Ewing.
Unlike his fellow members on the Board, Zimmerman
upheld an employee's right to refuse to work under hazar-
dous conditions when the employee's refusal is based on
the enforcement of a work-related statutory right. Such in-
dividual activity is within the meaning of concerted activ-
ity because the right enforced is one shared by and created
for employees as a group. The presumption is that an
employee enforcing a statutory right is performing an ac-
tivity that would be endorsed by his fellow employees.
Zimmerman's two major criticisms of the majority's
reasoning were: (1) whether an assertion of a statutorily
protected right is concerted should not depend on whether
an employee can conjure up group support in advance of
his complaint, and (2) the majority's decision is inconsis-
tent with NLRA policy which guarantees that employees
do not lose their jobs when challenging an employer on
matters related to terms and conditions of employment.
Assuming a work-related statutory right is not just an In-
dividual but also a collective right, then the term "concerted"
in section 7 should only bar protection to individual activ-
ity when it has no relationship to any collective right.
The NLRA was, in part, enacted to avoid placing
workers in the situation where they have to decide between
their jobs or their lives. Unfortunately, the Board has aban-
doned logical reasoning like that of Alleluia Cushion, has
failed to extend its own sound judgment found in the In-
terboro Doctrine, and has not yet re-examined Myers under
the principles of City Disposal, all of which would avoid
creating a "catch-22" for individual nonunionized
employees. Nevertheless, the reality is that union
employees, by benefit of their contract, are protected in
situations in which nonunion employees enforcing a work-
related statutory right are not. The sheer logic and sound
policy arguments of Zimmerman reflected as they are in
Ewing, have been hard pressed to find support in a Reagan
controlled Board. The President's control, unfortunately,
does not end at the Board. It has extended to OSHA, the
individual employee's sole avenue of redress after Myers.
Thus, doubt exists over the extent to which the OSH Act
is still capable of assuring so far as possible every working
man and woman in the nation safe and healthful working
conditions."
The means by which the lofty and important ends of
the OSH Act are to be reached have been so retarded by
the present administration that two major problems are very
apparent for the individual nonunion employee refusing or
protesting unsafe working conditions: (1) if the Myers stan-
dard is maintained, how effective will the worker's right to
on-site job inspections be in detouring employers from in-
creasing productivity at the expense of required safety in-
puts, and (2) in light of the limitations placed on worker's
rights and the different procedures provided by section
11(c) of the OSH Act and section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA,
how effective can OSHA be in filling the void left in workers'
rights created by Myers?
OSHA: THE INVISIBLE HAND
IS OFTEN IGNORED
Deregulation In the Name of Productivity
According to one commentator, it is clear that the
Reagan Administration regards the enforcement of health
and safety regulations as a nuisance.'n Compliance with
regulations is fine, so long as it is done with the least in-
convenience to business. Reagan himself has said regula-
tion "impedes the operation of markets, inhibits competi-
tion or imposes unnecessary cost on firms and unnecessar-
ily high prices on consumers.' This belief is reflected not
only in domestic factories where safety and health condi-
tions are deteriorating, but also in the minds of employers
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who believe the safety issue is less urgent than it once was.
When it comes to occupational safety, the administration
is guilty of neglect, while employers are guilty of greed as
well as neglect.
Very few workplace-safety rules and exposure stan-
dards have been issued by the Reagan Administration. It
can also take up to one year for a proposed OSHA stan-
dard to make it through the Office of Management and
Budget and, often the result is a less stringently worded
rule. OSHA has sent a signal to industry that it no longer
takes its enforcement duties seriously. One consequence
of deregulation has been OSHA's practice of utilizing in-
formal conferences to a greater extent than litigation when
a workplace safety violation is discovered. As a result,
penalties have been reduced 50-90% and companies have
received generous extensions to meet OSHA
requirements.
45
In assessing the proper penalty, the OSHA compliance
officer and an area-director will consider four factors: the
good faith of the employer, the gravity of the violation, the
employer's history of compliance, and the size of the
employer. Aggressiveness of enforcement, however, is not
consistent. During the 1970's, the agency was toughest
under Dr. Eula Bingham's administration from 1977 to
1980.' During this period, the average penalty for
serious, willful, and repeat violations was $367.00. Of the
128, 544 violations cited, 83,000 received no penalties.
When Thome G. Auchter headed the administration from
1981 to 1983 the average penalty dipped to $221.13. Only
97,136 violations were recorded, and just over 25,000
received some penalty.47
OSHA's policies and practices have played a large
part in magnifying the effects of deregulation. The above
drop in penalties is influenced by the practice of not sub-
jecting a workplace to a regular on-site inspection if its ac-
cident rate does not exceed the national average for that
industry. Not only does this exempt three-quarters of the
nation's most hazardous manufacturing industries from
OSHA regulation, it has also created the incentive for com-
WORKPLACE ILLNESS AND INJURY4
(Incidence rates per 100 workers)
1984 1983
All private industry
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation and
public utilities
Wholesale and
retail trade
Finance, insurance
and real estate
Services
8.0 7.6
8.8 8.2
7.4 7.2
pany officials to manipulate safety records.49 Thus,
necessary inspections are avoided, and national averages
for injury and illness rates in industry tend to be skewed
downward.
Alarmingly, workplace illness and injury rates are up
from 1983 to 1984. One explanation is that employers lack
incentive to invest in safety. The other is that employees
lack the incentive to utilize their rights granted under the
Act. The basis for both effects is found in agency policy
and procedure as well as in the Act itself.
Economic Consequences of OSHA Policy
In many industries, employers do not create or main-
tain safe workplaces; therefore, OSHA must enforce com-
pliance with safety standards through the likelihood of in-
spection and the stringency of civil penalties which may
be imposed. If firms do not have the incentive to bear all
the costs of occupational injuries associated with their pro-
duction, the human resource tends to be wasted. In
economic terms, products can be produced at lower costs
as long as safety costs are not internalized. Internalization
via investment in safety inputs is profitable for the firm only
to the point where the input's marginal cost is offset by
the marginal savings created through injury reduction.
Simply stated, no safety input is added if the firm is not
at least equally compensated in terms of reducing produc-
tion loss, minimizing machine damage, lowering workmen's
compensation premiums, or avoiding a safety and health
violation and penalty.' Since worker's compensation
and OSHA penalties cost firms less than they benefit
workers, employees tend to subsidize the firm's injury and
illness costs. Decreasing OSHA inspection and penalty
levels only makes safety investment more unprofitable
because the cost of compliance will exceed the cost of viola-
tion. Unable to put pressure on an employer through the
NLRA to increase safety investment, the individual nonu-
nion employee is forced to accept the externalities
associated with an ineffective OSHA.
From 1972 to 1982 the percentage of total capital in-
vestment for employee safety and health has declined in
nearly all major industries.5 ' This trend is blamed on the
slowing of OSHA's regulatory activity - proposing fewer
standards results in firms contributing a lower portion of
capital spending to safety and health. Another factor which
caused employers to cut spending on health and safety was
the recession of 1980. In order to be better able to com-
pete in world markets, firms began laying off safety
engineers. Further efforts to cut costs resulted in hiring
fewer well-trained supervisors as well as less experienced
workers.5 2 The overall effect is more workers who are less
likely to notice, avoid, and report safety violations, but who
are more likely to be confronted by them.
The National Safety Council's (NSC) report for 1984
shows that rates for work-related injuries, illnesses, and
deaths began rising in 1984. According to NSC, fatalities
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are up 21% in 1984 from 1983, to 3,740, injuries are up
13% in the same year, to 5.3 million, and total cost for
the above is estimated at 33 billion dollars.m
The 1984 increases in accident/illness rates comes
three years after the Reagan Administration started cut-
ting health and safety enforcement, and five years after
employers began decreasing health and safety investment.
These facts fit the general pattern of a three to five year
time-lag between policy change and result. Spending for
health and safety was up slightly since 1984; it should be
interesting to see how this trend will affect the troubling
rise in recent statistics.
Nevertheless, incentive for preinspection abatement is
effected by more than just inspection frequency and penalty
magnitude. Increased litigation of OSHA citations and the
inspection activity warrant requirement have also diminish-
ed employer willingness to comply, thus putting more
pressure on injury/illness statistics to rise. The Supreme
Courfs decision in Marshall v. Barlows, Inc.' gave the
employer the right to refuse to admit an inspector. When
the inspector returns with a warrant, he can again be refus-
ed entry. Weeks of delay finally culminate in a hearing
before a Federal District Court Judge; nevertheless, the in-
spector's effectiveness has been destroyed even if the
employer must honor the warrant. With advance
knowledge of what the inspector will focus on, the employer
can "mask" the potential violations for the inspection, and
avoid not only a penalty but an increase in production cost
as well.
All in all, employers, with the Reagan Administration's
blessings, have been very successful in transferring safety
costs to the employee. Robert Abrams, the New York State
Attorney General, summed up the message OSHA sends
to employers: "feel free to violate health and safety laws
because no one is likely to bother you."55
The Practical Consequences of OSHA Policy
On Employee Rights
Employees perform a primary function in the pro-
mulgation of safety standards. Because they have the ability
to petition the Secretary for inspection of a suspect
workplace, workers are placed in the best position to get
hazardous conditions corrected. The goals of the Act are
meant to be attained through the active participation bet-
ween employers and employees. However, the rights
granted each party are directed more to protecting selfish
interests than to encouraging combined efforts. As policy
decisions have bolstered employer rights under the Act,
employee rights have lost their value. Clearly, when
employers can utilize their rights to squelch the usefulness
of employee rights, the result is ineffective legislation. The
effects of the administration's policies are evident not only
in employer behavior, but also in their disastrous effects
on employee rights.
When an individual employee requests an inspection
under section 8(f), he is not refusing to do work (the right
given and taken away under the NLRA), but is seeking
compliance with safety standards. The right, however, is
limited by the resources available to the Department of
Labor. In 1985, OSHA had 1,089 inspectors (down 15%
from 1979) with which to regulate 4.6 million
workplaces.' This year, budget cuts are expected to ex-
tend the limited OSHA staff beyond anything it can ac-
complish. The 1982 budget cuts also did a great amount
of damage. One-third of the agencys field offices were clos-
ed, 150 inspectors were fired, and another 150 retired.
From 1980 to 1983 the number of inspectors declined by
over three-hundred; 1,200 inspector vacancies remained
unfilled since 1982. The lack of inspector resources in one
major reason for an 80% decrease in the dollar amount
of fines levied against negligent companies since 1980."
In 1980 the agency performed 63,363 inspections.5 8
That number decreased to 43,583 in 1982, of which 8,000
were only record checks not on-site inspections. In the first
half of fiscal 1983, 64% more inspections were denied than
in all of 1982. Workplace inspections are expected to
decrease by 6,500 in the upcoming year.s9 As workers
lose faith in OSHA's ability to uphold their rights, they tend
to argue for fewer major production or process changes.
From 1980 to 1982 complaint initiated inspections declined
by 58%, and in this same period OSHA follow-up inspec-
tions declined by 86%.' The signal OSHA is sending to
individual nonunion employees is obvious: don't count on
OSHA because it is not likely to help you.
Highlighting the Difference Between
the NLRA and OSH Act
Under section 11(c) of OSHA, an employee cannot
be discriminated against because of the exercise, on behalf
of himself or any other employee, of any right afforded by
the Act. Yet, 11(c) has been weakened both substantively
and procedurally. Its protection is so limited that employers
can actually discriminate against their employees who do
initiate inspections without fear of one, being inspected,
and two, having to pay large back-pay awards. The dif-
ferences between the protection provided employees in
OSH Act section 11(c) and the NLRA section 8(a)(1)
underscore the need for employees to regain NLRA
protections.
The major procedural difference lies in the statute of
limitations allotted under the NLRA and OSH Act. An
employee has six months, under the NLRA, from the time
of the unfair labor practice in which to file with a Regional
Office. The complimentary OSH Act provision grants the
employee only 30 days, nearly a five month shorter period.
Since a successful 11(c) complaint is predicated upon the
report of an on-site inspection,61 and those have a nine-
month delay, it is not surprising that many individual nonu-
nion employees would not risk a discriminatory firing by
requesting an inspection. Backlog is not a problem exclusive
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to the inspection area. Since no private causes of action
are recognized under 11(c), there has been a heavy burden
placed on the Agency's over-extended resources. The
Secretary has dismissed many claims.
The Right to Refuse to Work
In 1973, OSHA released its interpretive regulation con-
sidering the issue of whether employees have a right to
refuse to work because of unsafe conditions.62 The inter-
pretation explained that, generally, the OSH Act affords
no right entitling employees to refuse to do work because
of potential unsafe conditions. However, if a reasonable
person, under the conditions then confronting the
employee, concluded that a real danger of death or serious
injury exists for which there is insufficient time to resort
to regular statutory enforcement channels, the employee
may refuse to expose himself to the dangerous condition.
On February 26, 1980, the Supreme Court, in Marshall
v. Whirlpool Corp.' unanimously upheld the Secretary's
interpretation.
The Whirlpool decision affirmed the Secretary of
Labor's interpretive regulation as a "permissible gloss on
the Act, in light of the Act's language, structure and
legislative history." The Court was moved by the argument
that OSHA inspectors cannot be present around the clock
in every workplace. The right to refuse hazardous work,
the Court stated, is implied in the duty of each employer
to provide a safe workplace for his employees. Never-
theless, the right is not absolute. The employee must prove
reasonableness in order to have the refusal fall within sec-
tion 11(c) protection.
Unlike the Washington Aluminum case or the Alleluia
Cushion decision in which reasonableness of the workers'
perception had no bearing on the dispute, the Court in
Whirlpool upheld the regulation as requiring the reasonable
belief that the hazard presents a real danger of death or
serious injury. Thus 11(c) protection is once again
distinguished from section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. In 8(a)(1)
cases, the inquiry would end once it was determined the
worker acted in good faith. Refusals to work under 11(c),
however, must be in good faith and there must be insuffi-
cient time to go through regular enforcement channels, the
belief held must be reasonable, and the danger must pose
an imminent risk of death or serious bodily injury.
Once again the "catch-22" arises. In order to avoid in-
jury, an employee must determine whether or not the
criteria of the regulations are met. Courts having faced such
determinations have found the employee has met his
burden when either egregious circumstances or a prior ac-
cident under similar conditions has occurred.' Apart from
this difficult burden on employees, any employee seeking
11(c) protection is also confronted with all of the earlier
procedural and substantive problems surrounding 11(c). A
right to refuse to work when seeking to enforce a statutory
right under the NLRA should be available, it should not
replace OSHA safety regulations, but should fill the void
in employee protection caused by the many limitations on
OSHA safeguards.
ALTERNATIVES TO OSHA
AND NLRA PROTECTION
Tax Incentives
OSHA attempts to enforce safety in the workplace
through direct control, or as some economists call it, a
"command and control" system. However, due to a variety
of factors, the market fails to achieve the desired outcome.
In other words, those who are regulated fail to internalize
the cost of safety, thus producing externalities - hazardous
conditions - bome by employees. If the market were
perfect, "the cost of the product should bear the blood of
the working man."'
The key is to develop a way of modifying incentives
faced by market participants. Presently, uniform standards,
set to control a limited number of physical conditions, tend
to place a heavier burden on fringe firms than on larger
ones. This is because when all firms are treated alike, they
do not have the same freedom to invest in safety at the
most efficient levels. However, under a system of tax in-
centives, as suggested by Nicholas and Zeckhauser,66
firms will seek to minimize externalities so that their pro-
duct's price will reflect the firm's tax savings. Instead of for-
cing firms out of the market for a failure to comply with
a uniform standard, firms failing to develop new procedures
for reducing workplace hazards will be driven from the
market because of higher taxes relative to other firms. If
the injury rate is not reduced, higher taxation will cause
the product's price to rise relative to firms taking advan-
tage of the tax incentive. Demand shifts to the product pro-
duced by the less hazardous firm thus opening the market
for firms utilizing the best safety technologies.
Rather than pitting employer against employee as the
OSH Act tends to do, tax incentives make it profitable for
labor participants to work together. When an employee
brings to the attention of his employer an unsafe condi-
tion which has caused or may potentially cause injury, it
would be in the employer's best interest to correct the pro-
blem expediently. Thus, the tax saving is taken advantage
of as soon as possible. To create an even larger incentive
to invest in the necessary safety inputs, tax breaks can also
be offered on the purchase of equipment.
The advantages of tax incentives are enormous. First,
prices will tend to reflect true cost, and inefficient (hazar-
dous) producers will be driven from the market. Second,
the burden on the employee of being a "watchdog" for
OSHA will be lessened. Third, OSHA will be able to direct
its limited resources away from costly procedural
mechanisms (complaint inspections, 11(c) hearings) and
place them in programs designed to inform industry about
safety. Tax incentives do not, unfortunately, totally relieve
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the need for safety standards. Nicholas and Zeckhauser
suggest choosing a standard with careful attention to
benefits and costs as an upper limit on injury magnitude.
Tax incentives then are applied to achieve lower levels of
worker injury.
Detractors of the injury tax incentive scheme argue that
when workers' safety depends on a firm's cost-benefit
analysis there is too much flexibility in allowing firms to
pay the charge rather than abate the hazard. This assump-
tion is based on a simple economic principle: since lower
injury rate firms can take advantage of lower prices by be-
ing just marginally safer than the lowest high injury rate
firm, least-cost preventive actions will arise.' In other
words, an equilibrium level will be reached where it would
be profitable to maintain some level of hazard and therefore
some degree of worker injury. In order to correct this market
failure, the focus often turns back to OSHA and penalty
modification. It is highly doubtful that OSHA under the
Reagan administration would accept a Carter task force
recommendation that penalties be calculated to offset the
net amount saved by cited employers. Although this greatly
increases the cost of noncompliance, Reagan has been
determined to go in the opposite direction and reduce all
costs to industry even in the face of worker suffering.
Public Policy Exception to the At-Will Doctrine
A basic problem with the tax incentive plan is that
workers are still forced to either work under hazardous con-
ditions or refuse to, risking the loss of their job if it is pro-
fitable for the employer to maintain some level of worker
injury. A problem similar to employers contesting OSHA
violations would be employers contesting adverse tax
assessments. Thus, otherwise non-profitable levels of in-
jury are maintainable with no ill-effect on the employer's
profit margin until the Tax Court makes a decision. A more
beneficial alternative for workers may very well be a judicial
exception to the at-will doctrine, as suggested by Daniel
T. Schibley.6
Under this theory, an employee may not be discharg-
ed for refusing to work under a condition which violates
the statute. The employee needs a good faith reasonable
belief that the violation existed. The burden of proof then
shifts to the employer to prove the disqualification would
have occurred even if the employee did not refuse to work.
The discharge must be based on legitimate business
reasons. This may cause employers to raise totally pretex-
tual responses which the employee may address. The
employee's prima facie case will be made once it is proven
that the motivating factor for the discharge was the
employee's refusal to work under hazardous conditions.
The employee's remedy should include compensation for
all injuries proximately resulting from his wrongful
discharge.
This public policy exception's strength is that workers
are protected in individual activities involving a refusal to
risk injury at the workplace. Also, a judicial response is
more immediate than waiting for the legislature to pass a
new tax bill. Legislative change only comes with pressure
from strong lobbying groups. Obviously, unorganized labor
would not be as likely as business to have its interests pro-
tected by strong lobbying efforts. However, employers
would still find profit in discharging employees relative to
the size of the court docket. If employers are aware of hear-
ing delays as well as the ability to appeal any adverse deci-
sion, individual nonunion employees may very well spend
their unemployment checks while waiting outside the court
house door.
Making Employers Accept Direct Responsibility
District attorneys have also brought employers into
court on criminal charges. Very often it is the decision of
a particular individual or group of company officials which
facilitates the worker injury or death. Piercing the corporate
veil and holding these individuals personally responsible for
the consequences of their decisions may provide the needed
incentive to head-off employer greed.
Under the Reagan administration, however, the
number of criminal cases brought by the government has
fallen drastically. Low conviction rates tend to decrease the
fear company officials have of criminal charges. It is also
apparent that only clear, outrageous violations are pursued
to criminal court. The majority of worker injuries are caus-
ed by hazards of an "insidious nature." Therefore, the
criminal charge idea only tends to deter a small number
of employers from maintaining obvious hazards.
Conclusion: The Need for a Unified Treatment
of Union and Nonunion Individual Employees
When an employee reasonably and in good faith
asserts a right secured by either an existing collective
bargaining agreement or by an employment-related statute,
the activity should be deemed concerted. The effectuation
of the policies and objectives that employment legislation
has established is hindered when section 7 protection is
denied individuals asserting that legislation. The logical
result of this is that employees will be denied basic rights,
such as the right to a safe workplace.
The remand of Prill provides an excellent opportunity
for the Board, utilizing the City Disposal decision, to recon-
sider formulation of a protected right for individuals to pro-
test unsafe working conditions. The new unified approach
could include the following criteria: (1) the complaint must
be grounded in a collective bargaining agreement or in a
relevant statute; (2) the complaint made is reasonable and
in good faith; (3) it is first pursued in any applicable
grievance or arbitration form; and (4) it is for the purpose
of mutual aid or protection.69 The fourth criteria is infer-
able from the substantive nature of the statutory right
asserted.
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Implied concertedness, therefore, would be available
to an individual nonunion employee as a means of protect-
ing that employee and any co-workers from their employer's
breach of a statutory regulation. More importantly, in many
respects, the employee has another avenue of redress
besides OSHA as a way of avoiding a discriminatory fir-
ing. Nevertheless, this extra arsenal for the employee is vir-
tually meaningless if an employer is capable of delaying a
court ordered remedy for as much as two to four years after
the date of the violation. Delay allows the employer to main-
tain a certain level of externalities, and the individual who
had the misfortune of facing the "catch-22" is saddled with
unemployment and its mounting anxiety.
The time is ripe for the Supreme Court to finally
alleviate the confusion in individual nonunionized employee
cases. Unsafe working conditions are being tolerated to-
day because Reagan Administration policy has allowed
employers to circumvent their statutory responsibilities. The
Supreme Court should not sit idly as workers' injury rates
and death rates rise. City Disposal and Washington
Aluminum are indications that the High Court might speak
for the nonunionized employee.
Once unionized and nonunionized workers' rights are
unified, the NLRB and OSHA could seek more efficient
uses of their resources. OSHA should seek to encourage
management-labor cooperation in dealing with safety pro-
blems. Perhaps added protection of individual employee
rights grounded in a Supreme Court decision will make
employers less willing to maintain unsafe workplaces.
Hence, OSHA could move away from a highly intrusive
"command and control" system of regulation, and with con-
gressional support, implement an approved tax incentive
or injury tax program. Increased labor-management
cooperation would de-emphasize the effects of least cost
prevention, and result in a virtual elimination of worker sub-
sidization of employer safety costs. Quite simply, there is
no justification for increased productivity at the expense
of worker-safety. Any policy which perpetrates this ideal
should be condemned in the most expedient, efficient, and
certain way.
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